Aux Armes, Citoyens! (Updated with my latest Paris photos!)
To hear the Allies tell the story, Paris fell to marching British, American and, oh yeah, some Free French troops.
But the true story is much, much different.
In August of 1944, Eisenhower had no plans to drive on Paris. He felt that Paris was of little strategic purpose at that point of the war and, as on the Eastern Front, thought that Hitler would turn it into a fortress city that would have to be fought over in brutal urban warfare. This, he reasoned, would be good for neither the Allies nor the Parisians.
Possibly a somewhat darker motivation was to prevent the Allies taking responsibility for millions of starving Parisians. Paris was, in August of 1944, starving. While France is a breadbasket, most of the food was going to Germany and rations in the city had been drastically scaled back even before the June invasion. The loss of fertile territory to the north made the problem more acute. Diverting huge amounts of resources to the logistics of feeding Paris would, Eisenhower feared, prevent the Allies from reaching Berlin. Quite possibly, he was right.
But events overtook Eisenhower. As Paris became aware that the Allies were only 100km away, wheels were set in motion that would change the course of the war as well as post-war Europe. The German general in charge of defending or destroying Paris, after having met with Hitler in East Prussia, realized the war was lost. Dietrich von Choltitz was an avid lover of Paris and resolved to deliver the city unharmed. Raoul Nordling, a Swedish diplomat in the city, was to be his sounding board on how to accomplish this without 1) being killed by the Resistance and 2) having his family killed by Hitler.
While von Choltitz negotiated, Paris was being drained of its combat personnel. The fewer Germans, the more bold the Resistance became. Collaborators were threatened or openly attacked. For one thing, in the final days the Gestapo was in the process of shipping out as many Jews and political prisoners as possible.
The Collaborators, too, began evacuating Paris, fearing the aftermath of Liberation. Trains began leaving Paris with members of the Milice. All of this led to a feeling that Paris was soon to be lost. Just as the Allies feared a street battle in Paris, von Choltitz knew that he lacked sufficient troops to put up any kind of a fight and the only result would be a massacre, myriad of civilian deaths and destruction of the city.
His other option, to destroy the city's infrastructure and landmarks, was made more difficult by the lack of explosives. At least there are many French historians that claim that is the case. There were a great deal of torpedoes that were being shipped to the west coast, but these would have been difficult to set off. So it is well possible that von Choltitz was bluffing, trying to save himself.
The shipment of Jews, Communists and other political prisoners to concentration camps went against agreements that the Germans had made with Vichy. This roused the ire of ordinary Frenchmen and soon a general strike was called. Workers on the Metro (what was left of it, electrical generation was very irregular during this time in Paris) and the telephones were out. This, in turn, scared the police.
The major factor in the fall of Paris was the end of police collaboration in the city. The police, while somewhat innocent of outright collaboration and atrocities, had been the enabling factor in the continuing occupation of the city. However, by mid-August, the police knew that the jig was up and worried that they, too, would be seen as collaborators. Negotiations began between the Paris police, the Resistance and even DeGaulle's government in exile. Not lost on the Police and pro-German collaborators was the evacuation of Paris by non-combatant Germans. The administration of the occupation was in flight.
And, so, De Gaulle--the de facto leader of France in exile--directed Gen. Philippe Leclerc of the 2nd Armored Division to swing south toward Paris. It's even possible that Patton was in on this. Whether Leclerc was acting with the acquiescence of Patton or not, by the time Eisenhower was aware of it, the 2nd Armored Division's dash into the suburbs of Paris was a fait accompli.
The Police stopped communicating with the Germans and holed up in the Palais de Justice on the Isle de France, near Notre Dame. They claimed loyalty with De Gaulle's government in exile. This creates a great deal of friction with the FFI, who are now actually on the streets throwing up barricades and breaking out prisoners from German prisons. However, Germans were now planning to get out, rather than fighting to control the city--which was clearly not possible for them to do without the Milice and the Paris Police.
And so, the only thing that was left to be done was to get Choltitz to sign off on the surrender. The only card he had was that he was ordered to (and would, if necessary) set off explosives throughout the city. Through the Swedes, Choltitz communicated that he would only surrender to a military man, rather than a member of the resistance. Not without reason, members of the resistance would without little doubt have killed him. This is why it was so important to get Leclerc (or at least a senior officer--and in fact there were negotiations about the proper rank for a general to surrender to) into Paris to take the keys.
So why doesn't the resistance get more credit for liberating Paris? For starters, there is the sense that they only grew up in a vacuum. That they seized control of a city that had, in a sense, already surrendered. Second, they were, for the most part, communists. From Churchill on down, no one in the Allied command wanted to give the communists credit for anything. Finally, the resistance got duped. They won the battle, but lost the peace because while they fought the Germans the Police were on the line with London vowing to support De Gaulle and his government in exile.
This week is the 75th Anniversary of the Liberation of Paris, so let's celebrate! As an aside, the first American in Paris was Ernest Hemingway, who arrived with his rag tag group of misfits and Resistance fighters to liberate the wine cellar of the Paris Ritz Carlton on the Place Vendome!
So let's look at some of the scenarios in the liberation of Paris:
I've not played any of these, but I tend to like March Madness scenarios. None of these have a lot of playings and, unfortunately, many are out of print.
In August of 1944, Eisenhower had no plans to drive on Paris. He felt that Paris was of little strategic purpose at that point of the war and, as on the Eastern Front, thought that Hitler would turn it into a fortress city that would have to be fought over in brutal urban warfare. This, he reasoned, would be good for neither the Allies nor the Parisians.
Possibly a somewhat darker motivation was to prevent the Allies taking responsibility for millions of starving Parisians. Paris was, in August of 1944, starving. While France is a breadbasket, most of the food was going to Germany and rations in the city had been drastically scaled back even before the June invasion. The loss of fertile territory to the north made the problem more acute. Diverting huge amounts of resources to the logistics of feeding Paris would, Eisenhower feared, prevent the Allies from reaching Berlin. Quite possibly, he was right.
But events overtook Eisenhower. As Paris became aware that the Allies were only 100km away, wheels were set in motion that would change the course of the war as well as post-war Europe. The German general in charge of defending or destroying Paris, after having met with Hitler in East Prussia, realized the war was lost. Dietrich von Choltitz was an avid lover of Paris and resolved to deliver the city unharmed. Raoul Nordling, a Swedish diplomat in the city, was to be his sounding board on how to accomplish this without 1) being killed by the Resistance and 2) having his family killed by Hitler.
While von Choltitz negotiated, Paris was being drained of its combat personnel. The fewer Germans, the more bold the Resistance became. Collaborators were threatened or openly attacked. For one thing, in the final days the Gestapo was in the process of shipping out as many Jews and political prisoners as possible.
The Collaborators, too, began evacuating Paris, fearing the aftermath of Liberation. Trains began leaving Paris with members of the Milice. All of this led to a feeling that Paris was soon to be lost. Just as the Allies feared a street battle in Paris, von Choltitz knew that he lacked sufficient troops to put up any kind of a fight and the only result would be a massacre, myriad of civilian deaths and destruction of the city.
His other option, to destroy the city's infrastructure and landmarks, was made more difficult by the lack of explosives. At least there are many French historians that claim that is the case. There were a great deal of torpedoes that were being shipped to the west coast, but these would have been difficult to set off. So it is well possible that von Choltitz was bluffing, trying to save himself.
The shipment of Jews, Communists and other political prisoners to concentration camps went against agreements that the Germans had made with Vichy. This roused the ire of ordinary Frenchmen and soon a general strike was called. Workers on the Metro (what was left of it, electrical generation was very irregular during this time in Paris) and the telephones were out. This, in turn, scared the police.
The major factor in the fall of Paris was the end of police collaboration in the city. The police, while somewhat innocent of outright collaboration and atrocities, had been the enabling factor in the continuing occupation of the city. However, by mid-August, the police knew that the jig was up and worried that they, too, would be seen as collaborators. Negotiations began between the Paris police, the Resistance and even DeGaulle's government in exile. Not lost on the Police and pro-German collaborators was the evacuation of Paris by non-combatant Germans. The administration of the occupation was in flight.
And, so, De Gaulle--the de facto leader of France in exile--directed Gen. Philippe Leclerc of the 2nd Armored Division to swing south toward Paris. It's even possible that Patton was in on this. Whether Leclerc was acting with the acquiescence of Patton or not, by the time Eisenhower was aware of it, the 2nd Armored Division's dash into the suburbs of Paris was a fait accompli.
The Police stopped communicating with the Germans and holed up in the Palais de Justice on the Isle de France, near Notre Dame. They claimed loyalty with De Gaulle's government in exile. This creates a great deal of friction with the FFI, who are now actually on the streets throwing up barricades and breaking out prisoners from German prisons. However, Germans were now planning to get out, rather than fighting to control the city--which was clearly not possible for them to do without the Milice and the Paris Police.
And so, the only thing that was left to be done was to get Choltitz to sign off on the surrender. The only card he had was that he was ordered to (and would, if necessary) set off explosives throughout the city. Through the Swedes, Choltitz communicated that he would only surrender to a military man, rather than a member of the resistance. Not without reason, members of the resistance would without little doubt have killed him. This is why it was so important to get Leclerc (or at least a senior officer--and in fact there were negotiations about the proper rank for a general to surrender to) into Paris to take the keys.
So why doesn't the resistance get more credit for liberating Paris? For starters, there is the sense that they only grew up in a vacuum. That they seized control of a city that had, in a sense, already surrendered. Second, they were, for the most part, communists. From Churchill on down, no one in the Allied command wanted to give the communists credit for anything. Finally, the resistance got duped. They won the battle, but lost the peace because while they fought the Germans the Police were on the line with London vowing to support De Gaulle and his government in exile.
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| This is the Char Franche Comte, named after the region of France where I live. Vive la Franche Comte! |
So let's look at some of the scenarios in the liberation of Paris:
8 Results(Showing 1 to 8) |
| ID | Scenario | Rating | Attacker | S/A/G | Defender | S/A/G | Date | Publication |
| MM05 | Ambushing the Warheads | 10.00 | German | 8/0/0 | Partisan (FFI) | 11/0/0 | 1944-08-24 | March Madness `10 - Irregular Forces Pack |
| FE47 | Aux Barricades! | German | 16/5/0 | Partisan (FFI) | 13/0/0 | 1944-08-21 | Fanatic Pack 3 | |
| GJ026 | Chamber of Deputies | Free French | 12/8/0 | German | 6/0/2 | 1944-08-25 | Grumble Jones | |
| MM04 | Is Paris Burning? | 7.33 | German | 15/4/0 | Partisan (FFI) | 19/0/0 | 1944-08-23 | March Madness `10 - Irregular Forces Pack |
| Scenario 2 | La Liberation du Paris 2: Retrouvailles (Reunion) | German | /4/0 | French | /2/0 | 1944-08-24 | Journal du Stratège | |
| NEWS34 | Seize Paris | Free French | /0/0 | German | /0/0 | 1944-08-24 | ASL News # 19 | |
| DB013 | The Men From Zadig | German | 10/3/0 | Partisan (FFI) | 6/0/0 | 1944-08-19 | Dispatches from the Bunker # 7 | |
| OB10 | The Men from Zadig | 7.50 | German | 10/3/0 | Partisan (FFI) | 7/0/0 | 1944-08-19 | Out of the Bunker |
I've not played any of these, but I tend to like March Madness scenarios. None of these have a lot of playings and, unfortunately, many are out of print.
I'd like to hear from people who have these out of print scenarios or have played them.
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